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NON-ZERO-SUM STOPPING GAMES IN DISCRETE TIME
ZHOU ZHOU
Abstract. We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin
games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each
player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to the other player’s action. In the first part
of the paper, we consider the game where players act simultaneously at each stage. We show that
there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed stopping strategies. In the second part, we assume that
one player has to act first at each stage. In this case, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in pure stopping strategies.
1. Introduction
As a classical model of stopping games, Dynkin game has attracted a lot of research. We refer
to [3–17] and the references therein. In a Dynkin game, each player chooses a stopping strategy,
and the payoffs are revealed when one player stops. In other words, the game ends at the minimum
of the stopping strategies. In practice, it is more often that, even if a player has made the decision
first, her payoff can still be affected by other players’ decisions later on. Therefore, it is more
reasonable to let the game end at the maximum of the stopping strategies. Moreover, a wise player
would adjust her strategy after she observes other players’ actions. Based on these two points,
recently [1, 2, 18] study the stopping games with these features. In particular, [1, 2] consider the
zero-sum case, and [1] investigates the non-zero-sum case in continuous time.
In this paper, given a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (F)t=0,... ,T ,P), we consider a non-zero-sum
stopping game in discrete time
ui(ρ, τ) = E[U i(ρ, τ)], i = 1, 2,
where the first (resp. second) player chooses ρ (resp. τ) to maximize the payoff u1 (resp. u2). Here
U i(s, t) is Fs∨t-measurable instead of Fs∧t-measurable as is assumed in Dynkin games. That is,
the game ends at the maximum of ρ and τ . Moreover, here ρ and τ are not (randomized) stopping
times, they are strategies that can be adjusted according to each other.
In the first part of the paper, we consider the case when the two players act simultaneously at
each stage (here both “stop” and “not stop” are actions). We show that there exists a perfect
Nash equilibrium in mixed stopping strategies. The main idea to prove the result is to convert the
original problem to a non-zero-sum Dynkin game with randomized stopping times.
In the second part of the paper, we consider the game where one player acts first at each stage. In
this case, we show that there always exists a perfect Nash equilibrium in pure stopping strategies.
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2We use the idea in [18] to prove this result. That is, we first construct saddle points for some related
zero-sum stopping games, and then using these saddle points we construct a Nash equilibrium for
the non-zero-sum games.
This paper extends the result in [18] to the discrete time case. It has a broad range of applications,
e.g., when companies choose times to enter the market, or when investors who both long and short
American options choose times to exercise the options.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we consider the non-zero-sum stopping
game when two players act simultaneously at each stage. In Section 3, we study the case when
one player acts first at each stage. In Section 4, we make a comparison between our discrete-time
results in this paper and the continuous-time result in [18].
2. Stopping games where players act simultaneously at each stage
In this section, we consider the non-zero-sum stopping game where players act simultaneously
at each stage. We will consider mixed stopping strategies for the game. Theorem 2.5 is the main
result of this section.
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t=0,... ,T ,P) be a filtered probability space, where Ω is countably generated, and
T ∈ N is the finite time horizon. Let T be the set of stopping times taking values in {0, . . . , T}.
For any σ ∈ T , let Tσ := {ρ ∈ T , ρ ≥ τ}, and Tσ+ := {ρ ∈ T , ρ ≥ (τ + 1) ∧ T}. Define
T
a := {φ : {0, . . . , T} × Ω 7→ {0, . . . , T} : φ(t, ·) ∈ Tt+, t = 0, . . . , T}.
Let T r be the set of randomized stopping times. That is, for any α ∈ T r, α : [0, 1]×Ω 7→ {0, . . . , T}
is B([0, 1]) ⊗F-measurable, and α(p, ·) ∈ T for any p ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2.1. (ρ0, ρ1) is said to be a (pure) stopping strategy of type A, if ρ0 ∈ T and ρ1 ∈ T
a.
Denote Ta as the set of (pure) stopping strategies of type A.
For (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T
a, ρ0 represents a player’s initial (pure) stopping strategy, and ρ1(t, ·) represents
the strategy adjusted by the player after she observes the other player’s stopping at time t. For
ρ = (ρ0, ρ1), τ = (τ0, τ1) ∈ T
a, denote
ρ[τ ] := ρ01{ρ0≤τ0} + ρ1(τ0)1{ρ0>τ0}.
Definition 2.2. (α, ρ1) is said to be a mixed stopping strategy of type A, if α ∈ T
r and ρ1 ∈ T
a.
Denote Tar as the set of mixed stopping strategies of type A.
Remark 2.3. One can also randomize the strategies in Ti. However, it turns out that we only need
to randomize players’ initial stopping times (i.e., the first component of (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T
a)), in order to
get the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the stopping game introduced below.
For i = 1, 2, let U i : {0, . . . , T} × {0, . . . , T} × Ω 7→ R, such that U i(s, t, ·) is Fs∨t-measurable.
For simplicity, we assume that U i is bounded for i = 1, 2. Consider the non-zero-sum stopping
game
ui(ρ, τ) =
∫
[0,1]2
Γi (ρ(p, ·), τ(q, ·)) dpdq, ρ, τ ∈ Tar, i = 1, 2, (2.1)
3where for i = 1, 2 and ζ = (ζ0, ζ1), η = (η0, η1) ∈ T
a,
Γi(ζ, η) = E
[
U i(ζ[η], η[ζ])
]
= E
[
U i(ζ0, η1(ζ0))1{ζ0<η0} + U
i(ζ1(η0), η0)1{ζ0>η0} + U
i(ζ0, ζ0)1ζ0=η0}
]
.
Here the first player chooses ρ to maximize u1 and the second player chooses τ to maximize u2.
Recall the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.4. (ρ∗, τ∗) ∈ (Tar)2 is said to be a Nash equilibrium in Tar for the game (2.1), if for
any ρ, τ ∈ Tar,
u1(ρ, τ∗) ≤ u1(ρ∗, τ∗) and u2(ρ∗, τ) ≤ u2(ρ∗, τ∗).
Below is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.5. There exists a Nash equilibrium in Tar for the game (2.1).
Remark 2.6. We cannot guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the game (2.1) if
players only use pure stopping strategies of type A (i.e., Ta). Consider the following deterministic
one-period example. Let T = 1 and u1(s, t) = −u2(s, t) = 1{s=t} for s, t = 0, 1. Then it is easy to
see that Ta = {0, 1}. Obviously there is no Nash equilibrium for (2.1) in Ta.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. For t = 0, . . . , T , let
Y 1t := ess sup
σ∈Tt+
Et[U
1(σ, t)] and X2t := ess sup
σ∈Tt+
Et[U
2(t, σ)],
where Eθ[·] := E[·|Fθ] for θ ∈ T . For t = 0, . . . , T , let ρ
∗
1(t, ·) ∈ Tt+ and τ
∗
1 (t, ·) ∈ Tt+ be optimizers
for Y 1t and X
2
t respectively. That is,
Et[U
1(ρ∗1(t), t)] = Y
1
t and Et[U
2(t, τ∗1 (t))] = X
2
t , a.s..
Obviously ρ∗1(·, ·), τ
∗
1 (·, ·) ∈ T
a. For t = 0, . . . , T , define
X1t := Et[U
1(t, τ∗1 (t))], Y
2
t := Et[U
2(ρ∗1(t), t)], and Z
i
t = U
i(t, t), i = 1, 2.
Now consider the non-zero-sum Dynkin game with randomized stopping times
u˜i(α, β) =
∫
[0,1]2
(
E
[
Xiα1{α<β} + Y
i
β1{α>β} + Z
i
α1{α=β}
])
dpdq, i = 1, 2, (2.2)
for α, β ∈ T r. By [5, Theorem 2.1], there exists a Nash equilibrium (α∗, β∗) ∈ (T r)2 for the Dynkin
game (2.2). That is, for any α, β ∈ T r,
u˜1(α, β∗) ≤ u˜1(α∗, β∗) and u˜2(α∗, β) ≤ u˜2(α∗, β∗). (2.3)
4Let ρ∗m := (α
∗, ρ∗1) and τ
∗
m := (β
∗, τ∗1 ). Now let us show that (ρ
∗
m, τ
∗
m) ∈ (T
ar)2 is a Nash
equilibrium for the game (2.1). Take ρ = (α, ρ1) ∈ T
ar. We have that
u1(ρ, τ∗m) =
∫
[0,1]2
(
E
[
U1(α, τ∗1 (α))1{α<β∗} + U
1(ρ1(β
∗), β∗)1{α>β∗} + U
i(α,α)1{α=β∗}
])
dpdq
=
∫
[0,1]2
(
E
[
Eα[U
1(α, τ∗1 (α))]1{α<β∗} + Eβ∗ [U
1(ρ1(β
∗), β∗)]1{α>β∗} + U
i(α,α)1{α=β∗}
])
dpdq
≤
∫
[0,1]2
(
E
[
X1α1{α<β∗} + Y
1
β∗1{α>β∗} + Z
1
α1{α=β∗}
])
dpdq
≤
∫
[0,1]2
(
E
[
X1α∗1{α∗<β∗} + Y
1
β∗1{α∗>β∗} + Z
1
α∗1{α∗=β∗}
])
dpdq
=
∫
[0,1]2
(
E
[
U1(α∗, τ∗1 (α))1{α∗<β∗} + U
1(ρ∗1(β
∗), β∗)1{α∗>β∗} + U
i(α∗, α∗)1{α∗=β∗}
])
dpdq
= u1(ρ∗m, τ
∗
m),
where we use (2.3) for the fourth (in)equality. Similarly, we can show that for any τ ∈ Tar,
u2(ρ∗m, τ) ≤ u
2(ρ∗m, τ
∗
m).
This completes the proof of the result. 
3. Stopping games where one player acts first at each stage
In this section, we consider the stopping games in which one player acts first at each stage. We
show that there always exists a Nash equilibrium in pure stopping strategies. Theorem 3.3 is the
main result of this section.
Let
T
b := {ψ : {0, . . . , T} × Ω 7→ {0, . . . , T} : ψ(t, ·) ∈ Tt}.
Here ψ ∈ Tb represents a player’s (player 2) strategy adjusted at the time when the other player
(player 1) stops. In other words, player 1 acts first at each stage. (Compare Tb with Ta.)
Definition 3.1. (τ0, τ1) is said to be a (pure) stopping strategy of type B, if τ0 ∈ T and τ1 ∈ T
b.
Denote Tb as the set of (pure) stopping strategies of type B.
For any ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T
a, τ = (τ0, τ1) ∈ T
b,
ρ〈τ〉 := ρ01{ρ0≤τ0} + ρ1(τ0)1{ρ0>τ0} and τ〈ρ〉 := τ01{τ0<ρ0} + τ1(ρ0)1{τ0≥ρ0}.
Consider the non-zero-sum stopping game
wi(ρ, τ) := E
[
U i(ρ〈τ〉, τ〈ρ〉)
]
= E
[
U i(ρ0, τ1(ρ0))1{ρ0≤τ0} + U
i(ρ1(τ0), τ0)1{ρ0>τ0}
]
, (3.1)
for ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T
a, τ = (τ0, τ1) ∈ T
b and i = 1, 2.
Definition 3.2. (ρ∗, τ∗) ∈ Ta × Tb is said to be a Nash equilibrium for the game (3.1), if for any
ρ ∈ Ta and τ ∈ Tb,
w1(ρ, τ∗) ≤ w1(ρ∗, τ∗) and w2(ρ∗, τ) ≤ w2(ρ∗, τ∗).
5Below is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3. There exists a Nash equilibrium for the game (3.1).
We will use the idea in [18] to prove Theorem 3.3. To be more specific, we will use the saddle
points of some zero-sum stopping games to construct a Nash equilibrium for the non-zero-sum
game (3.1). We will first provide some results in the zero-sum case in Section 3.1. Then we prove
Theorem 3.3 in Section 3.2.
3.1. Zero-sum case. We consider the stopping game in the zero-sum case, i.e., when U1 = −U2 =
U . We will construct a saddle point for the zero-sum game. (The results in this section are essentially
provided in [2]. We present them for the completeness of this paper.)
For any σ ∈ T , consider the zero-sum stopping game
vσ := ess sup
ρ∈Taσ
ess inf
τ∈Tbσ
Eσ [U(ρ〈τ〉, τ〈ρ〉)] , (3.2)
and
vσ := ess inf
τ∈Tbσ
ess sup
ρ∈Taσ
Eσ [U(ρ〈τ〉, τ〈ρ〉)] , (3.3)
where
T
a
σ := {(ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T
a : ρ0 ≥ σ} and T
b
σ := {(ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T
b : ρ0 ≥ σ}.
For t = 0, . . . , T , let
Ft := ess inf
ξ∈Tt
Et[U(t, ξ)] and Gt :=
(
ess sup
ξ∈Tt+
Et[U(ξ, t)]
)
∨ Ft,
and ρ˜(t, ·) ∈ Tt+ and τ˜(t, ·) ∈ T be optimizers for ess supξ∈Tt+ Et[U(ξ, t)] and Ft respectively. Since
F ≤ G, we have that
vσ := ess sup
ρ∈Tσ
ess inf
τ∈Tσ
Eσ
[
Fρ1{ρ≤τ} +Gτ1{ρ>τ}
]
= ess inf
τ∈Tσ
ess sup
ρ∈Tσ
Eσ
[
Fρ1{ρ≤τ} +Gτ1{ρ>τ}
]
, (3.4)
and (ρσ, τσ) is a saddle point for the Dynkin game (3.4), where
ρσ := inf{t ≥ σ : vt = Ft} and τσ := inf{t ≥ σ : vt = Gt}.
That is, for any ρ, τ ∈ Tσ,
Eσ
[
Fρ1{ρ≤τσ} +Gτσ1{ρ>τσ}
]
≤ Eσ
[
Fρσ1{ρσ≤τσ} +Gτσ1{ρσ>τσ}
]
≤ Eσ
[
Fρσ1{ρσ≤τ} +Gτ1{ρσ>τ}
]
.
Let ρ∗σ := (ρσ, ρ˜) ∈ T
a and τ∗σ := (τσ, τ˜) ∈ T
b.
Proposition 3.4. We have vσ = vσ = vσ. Moreover, (ρ
∗
σ, τ
∗
σ) is a saddle point of the game (3.2)
and (3.3).
6Proof. Take τ = (τ0, τ1) ∈ T
b. We have that
Eσ [U(ρ
∗
σ〈τ〉, τ〈ρ
∗
σ〉)] = Eσ
[
U(ρσ , τ1(ρσ))1{ρσ≤τ0} + U(ρ˜(τ0), τ0)1{ρσ>τ0}
]
= Eσ
[
Eρσ [U(ρσ, τ1(ρσ))]1{ρσ≤τ0} + Eτ0 [U(ρ˜(τ0), τ0)]1{ρσ>τ0}
]
≥ Eσ
[
Fρσ1{ρσ≤τ0} +Gτ01{ρσ>τ0}
]
≥ Eσ
[
Fρσ1{ρσ≤τσ} +Gτσ1{ρσ>τσ}
]
= Eσ
[
U(ρσ , τ˜(ρσ))1{ρσ≤τσ} + U(ρ˜(τσ), τσ)1{ρσ>τσ}
]
= Eσ [U(ρ
∗
σ〈τ
∗
σ〉, τ
∗
σ〈ρ
∗
σ〉)] ,
where for the third and sixth (in)equalities we use the fact that, on {t < ρσ}, Gt ≥ vt > Ft, and
thus Gt = ess supξ∈Tt+ Et[U(ξ, t)] = Et[U(ρ˜(t), t)].
Similarly, we can show that for any ρ ∈ Ta,
Eσ [U(ρ〈τ
∗
σ〉, τ
∗
σ〈ρ〉)] ≤ Eσ [U(ρ
∗
σ〈τ
∗
σ〉, τ
∗
σ 〈ρ
∗
σ〉)] .
This completes the proof of the result. 
3.2. Proof of Theorem 3.3. We will use the saddle points of some related zero-sum stopping
games to construct a Nash equilibrium for the non-zero-sum game (3.1).
For t = 0, . . . , T , let
F 1t := ess inf
ξ∈Tt
Et[U
1(t, ξ)] and G1t :=
(
ess sup
ξ∈Tt+
Et[U
1(ξ, t)]
)
∨ F 1t ,
F 2t := ess sup
ξ∈Tt
Et[U
2(t, ξ)] and G2t :=
(
ess inf
ξ∈Tt+
Et[U
2(ξ, t)]
)
∧ F 2t ,
and
v1t := ess inf
τ∈Tt
ess sup
ρ∈Tt
Et
[
F 1t 1{ρ≤τ} +G
1
t 1{ρ>τ}
]
= ess sup
ρ∈Tt
ess inf
τ∈Tt
Et
[
F 1t 1{ρ≤τ} +G
1
t 1{ρ>τ}
]
, (3.5)
v2t := ess sup
τ∈Tt
ess inf
ρ∈Tt
Et
[
F 2t 1{ρ≤τ} +G
2
t 1{ρ>τ}
]
= ess inf
ρ∈Tt
ess sup
τ∈Tt
Et
[
F 2t 1{ρ≤τ} +G
2
t 1{ρ>τ}
]
. (3.6)
Let τ˜1(t), ρ˜1(t), τ˜2(t), ρ˜2(t) be optimizers for F 1t , ess supξ∈Tt+ Et[U
1(ξ, t)], F 2t , ess infξ∈Tt+ Et[U
2(ξ, t)]
respectively. Let
H1t := Et[U
1(t, τ˜2(t)] and H2t := Et[U
2(ρ˜1(t), t)]
for t = 0, . . . , T , and
µ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : v1t ≤ H
1
t } and µ
2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : v2t ≤ H
2
t ∧ F
2
t },
and
ρ2µ2 := inf{t ≥ µ
2 : v2t = F
2
t } and τ
1
µ1 := inf{t ≥ µ
1 : v1t = G
1
t }. (3.7)
Define
ρ∗0 =

µ
1, if µ1 ≤ µ2,
ρ2
µ2
, if µ1 > µ2,
ρ∗1(t) =

ρ˜
2(t), if t ≥ µ2 + 1 and µ1 > µ2,
ρ˜1(t), otherwise,
7τ∗0 =

τ
1
µ1
, if µ1 ≤ µ2,
µ2, if µ1 > µ2,
τ∗1 (t) =

τ˜
1(t), if t ≥ µ1 + 1 and µ1 ≤ µ2,
τ˜2(t), otherwise,
for t = 0, . . . , T , and
ρ∗ := (ρ∗0, ρ
∗
1) and τ
∗ := (τ∗0 , τ
∗
1 ).
It can be shown that ρ∗ ∈ Ta and τ∗ ∈ Tb.
Proposition 3.5. (ρ∗, τ∗) is a Nash equilibrium for the game (3.1). Therefore, Theorem 3.3 holds.
Proof. Part 1: We will show that
w1(ρ, τ∗) ≤ w1(ρ∗, τ∗) (3.8)
for any ρ ∈ Ta. As F 1 ≤ H1,
µ1 ≤ ρ10 := inf{t ≥ 0 : v
1
t = F
1
t }. (3.9)
Hence, on {t < µ1} we have that G1t ≥ v
1
t > F
1
t , and thus G
1
t = ess supξ∈Tt+ Et[U
1(ξ, t)] =
Et[U
1(ρ˜1(t), t)]. Then
w1(ρ∗, τ∗) = E
[
U1(µ1, τ˜2(µ1))1{µ1≤µ2} + U
1(ρ˜1(µ2), µ2)1{µ1>µ2}
]
= E
[
H1µ11{µ1≤µ2} +G
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
]
.
Now take ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T
a and consider w1(ρ, τ∗). We will consider four cases.
Case 1.1: A1 := {ρ0 < µ
1 ∧ µ2}. Since µ1 ≤ ρ10 by (3.9), the process (vt∧µ1)t=0,... ,T is a
sub-martingale. Then
E
[
U1(ρ〈τ∗〉, τ∗〈ρ〉)1A1
]
= E
[
U1(ρ0, τ˜
2(ρ0))1A1
]
= E
[
H1ρ01A1
]
≤ E
[
v1ρ01A1
]
= E
[
v1ρ0∧µ1∧µ21A1
]
≤ E
[
Eρ0∧µ1∧µ2
[
v1µ1∧µ2
]
1A1
]
= E
[(
v1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + v
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1A1
]
≤ E
[(
H1µ11{µ1≤µ2} +G
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1A1
]
.
Case 1.2: A2 := {ρ0 = µ
1 ∧ µ2}. We have that
E
[
U1(ρ〈τ∗〉, τ∗〈ρ〉)1A2
]
= E
[
U1(ρ0, τ˜
2(ρ0))1A2
]
= E
[
H1ρ01A2
]
= E
[(
H1µ11{µ1≤µ2} +H
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1A2
]
≤ E
[(
H1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + v
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1A2
]
≤ E
[(
H1µ11{µ1≤µ2} +G
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1A2
]
.
8Case 1.3: A3 := {ρ0 > µ
1 ∧ µ2} ∩ {µ1 ≤ µ2}. Let τˆ∗ := (τ1
µ1
, τ˜1) ∈ Tb. We have that
E
[
U1(ρ〈τ∗〉, τ∗〈ρ〉)1A3
]
= E
[
U1(ρ〈τˆ∗〉, τˆ∗〈ρ〉)1A3
]
= E
[
Eµ1
[
U1(ρ〈τˆ∗〉, τˆ∗〈ρ〉)
]
1A3
]
≤ E
[
v1µ11A3
]
≤ E
[
H1µ11A3
]
= E
[(
H1µ11{µ1≤µ2} +G
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1A3
]
.
Case 1.4: A4 := {ρ0 > µ
1 ∧ µ2} ∩ {µ1 > µ2}.
E
[
U1(ρ〈τ∗〉, τ∗〈ρ〉)1A4
]
= E
[
U1(ρ1(µ
2), µ2)1A4
]
≤ E
[
G1µ21A4
]
= E
[(
H1µ11{µ1≤µ2} +G
1
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1A4
]
.
By cases 1.1-1.4, we have (3.10) holds.
Part 2: We will show that
w2(ρ∗, τ) ≤ w2(ρ∗, τ∗) (3.10)
for any τ ∈ Tb. We have that
w2(ρ∗, τ∗) = E
[
U2(µ1, τ˜2(µ1))1{µ1≤µ2} + U
1(ρ˜1(µ2), µ2)1{µ1>µ2}
]
= E
[
F 2µ11{µ1≤µ2} +H
2
µ21{µ1>µ2}
]
.
Take τ = (τ0, τ1) ∈ T
b and consider w2(ρ∗, τ). We will consider five cases.
Case 2.1: B1 := {τ0 < µ
1∧µ2}. On {t < µ2}, F 2t ≥ v
2
t > H
2
t ∧F
2
t , and thus v
2
t > H
2
t ∧F
2
t = H
2
t .
Moreover, since H2 ∧ F 2 ≥ G2,
µ2 ≤ inf{t ≥ 0 : v2t = G
2
t }.
Hence, the process (v2
t∧µ2)t=0,... ,T is a sub-martingale. Then following the argument in the case 1.1,
we can show that
E
[
U2(ρ∗〈τ〉, τ〈ρ∗〉)1B1
]
≤ E
[(
F 2µ11{µ1≤µ2} +H
2
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1B1
]
.
Case 2.2: B2 := {τ0 = µ
1 ∧ µ2} ∩ {µ1 > µ2} ∩ {ρ2
µ2
= µ2}. We have that
E
[
U2(ρ∗〈τ〉, τ〈ρ∗〉)1B2
]
= E
[
U2(µ2, τ1(µ
2))1B2
]
≤ E
[
F 2µ21B2
]
= E
[
v2µ21B2
]
≤ E
[
H2µ21B2
]
= E
[(
F 2µ11{µ1≤µ2} +H
2
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1B2
]
,
where the third (in)equality follows from the definition of ρ2
µ2
in (3.7).
9Case 2.3: B3 := {τ0 = µ
1 ∧ µ2} \ ({µ1 > µ2} ∩ {ρ2
µ2
= µ2}). We have that
E
[
U2(ρ∗〈τ〉, τ〈ρ∗〉)1B3
]
= E
[(
U2(µ1, τ1(µ
1))1{µ1≤µ2} + U
2(ρ˜1(µ2), µ2)1{µ1>µ2}
)
1B2
]
≤ E
[(
F 2µ11{µ1≤µ2} +H
2
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1B3
]
.
Case 2.4: B4 := {τ0 > µ
1 ∧ µ2} ∩ {µ1 ≤ µ2}. Following the argument in case 1.4, we can show
that
E
[
U2(ρ∗〈τ〉, τ〈ρ∗〉)1B4
]
≤ E
[(
F 2µ11{µ1≤µ2} +H
2
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1B4
]
.
Case 2.5: B5 := {τ0 > µ
1 ∧ µ2} ∩ {µ1 > µ2}. Following the argument in case 1.3, we can show
that
E
[
U2(ρ∗〈τ〉, τ〈ρ∗〉)1B5
]
≤ E
[(
F 2µ11{µ1≤µ2} +H
2
µ21{µ1>µ2}
)
1B5
]
.
From cases 2.1-2.5, we have (3.10) holds. 
4. Comparison with the result in [18]
In this paper, regarding the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it leads to different
results whether players act simultaneously or not at each stage.
It can be expected that, in continuous time, as long as we have enough regularity for related
processes, we would have the existence of an (ǫ-) Nash equilibrium for the stopping game where
one player acts first at each time. Unlike the case in discrete time, if we impose some (right)
continuity assumption of U i in (s, t), then it would not make too much difference whether players
act simultaneously or not. Indeed, in [18], by assuming the continuity of U i in (s, t), we show
the existence of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for any ǫ > 0 for the stopping game in
continuous time, where players act simultaneously at each time.
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